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FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
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Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 920477

v.

Priority 2

PAUL WOOLLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction for this case is conferred upon the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953,
as amended).
Statement of Issues
I.

Whether statements made by the prosecutor in opening

statement amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.

The test for

determining whether a case should be reversed is if the remarks of
counsel call attention of the jurors to matters which they should
not consider and whether the jurors were influenced by the remarks
or the defendant was prejudiced.
426 (Utah 1973).

1

State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422,

II. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict the defendant of battery.

The standard of review is set

out in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), where the review
of the evidence is in the light most favorable to the jury verdict
and reversing only when the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive
or

inherently

improbable

that

reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime".

Petree, 659 P.2d at 444.
Determinative Provisions or Statutes

The determinative statute for this case is Section 11.08.020
of the Salt Lake City Code, which statute is set out fully in the
Addendum attached hereto.
Statement of Case
Defendant/Appellant Paul Woolley (hereinafter referred to as
defendant) was charged by way of Information with Battery, a Class
B misdemeanor, which occurred on February 3, 1992, in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

The case was tried before a jury on June 22, 1992,

with the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding. The jury found
defendant guilty of the offense and he was sentenced.
Statement of Facts
Appellee concurs with defendant's Statement of Facts with the
following additions.
During the opening statement at trial, counsel for appellee
introduced

herself,

stating that

she was

an

assistant

Prosecutor

for Salt Lake City and that she represented

City
the

government. She continued, stating "Somewhere along the line today
2

I want you to stop and think about what government means to you.
Particularly in a case like this.

The government represents you,

it represents'1. At that point an objection was made, leaving the
sentence uncompleted.

The objection was sustained and counsel

continued with "I work for Salt Lake City.

Because I represent

Salt Lake City I have no one to sit next to me at counsel table.
That is why I will be alone at counsel table and you need to
realize that that's my job here today"

(T. 3).

During defense counsel's opening statement, she admonished the
jury to keep in mind that "the only evidence you need to consider
is evidence that comes from people that sit in that witness chair
or evidence that the judge enters in such as documents or things of
that nature. What I or what Ms. Atkin say to you is not testimony"
(T. 5 ) .
Sammy Knighton, the witness who was with the victim at the
time of the incident, stated that the victim was hit and knocked
down, receiving a bruise (T. 8). He further described it as a hit
in the jaw with a fist, causing the jaw to become swollen (T. 9,
10, 33).

He said the person came from behind them but that he

could not remember to which side of him the victim was (T. p. 10,
12, 33). On cross-examination, the witness stated that the victim
was on his left side, but that the incident happened fast and he
could not remember everything (T. 12, 13). However, Mr. Knighton
positively identified the defendant as the person who hit the
victim (T. 9, 10, 31).

3

Albert Ortega, the step-brother of the victim, told the jury
that

his

step

sister

is

handicapped

with

a

"slow

mental

disability", for which she receives training at the Columbus
Community Center (T. 14). This witness did not see the incident
but ran from the house and saw defendant (T. 15). Mr. Ortega also
positively identified defendant (T. 16).
Juanita Valdez, the victim, testified that she was hit in
the jaw by the defendant (T. 21, 22).
At

the

close of

trial, the

Judge

instructed

the

jury

extensively, telling them to only base their considerations on
evidence from witnesses or exhibits or inferences drawn from proven
facts.

The jury was instructed to not consider statements of

counsel as evidence (R. 20; Instruction No. 6 set out fully in
Addendum).

In addition, an instruction was given listing the

factors the jury could consider in determining credibility of the
witnesses, which

included

their

demeanor, their

capacity

to

perceive, recollect and communicate, their opportunity to perceive,
etc. (R. 28-29; Instruction No. 14 set out fully in Addendum). The
jury was

also

instructed

to

not

base

any

verdict

on

mere

possibility, surmise or speculation (R. 31; Instruction No. 16 set
out fully in Addendum).
Summary of Argument
The remarks of the prosecutor in opening argument at trial of
this case did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct as they did
not call the attention of the jurors to evidence they should not
consider nor did they prejudice defendant's case. The remarks were
4

immediately objected to by defense counsel and Instructions given
by the Court mitigated any error that might have occurred.
There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of
battery

through the testimony of the witnesses, even though

portions of their testimony were inconsistent. The jury was in the
best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and their
determination resulted in defendant's conviction.
Argument
POINT I.
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PROSECUTOR IN OPENING
DID NOT AMOUNT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

STATEMENT

The opening statements in a jury trial are an important method
of providing the jury with an overview of the case and the people
involved in the trial.

The statements begin to guide the jury

through the entire trial process so they will more fully understand
their part and their ultimate responsibility.
The Utah

courts

have adopted

prosecutorial misconduct.

a two-prong

standard

for

For a case to be reversed, the remarks

must "call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would
not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and
were they, under the circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks".
(Utah 1973).

State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426

This test has been extensively applied in subsequent

cases.
In the case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), the
Supreme Court applied the Valdez test after the prosecutor told a
jury that defendant was using an alias, was in a federal witness
5

program, that he had been involved in "various criminal matters"
and compared him to known criminals with irrational behavior. The
Court found that both prongs of the test were met and defendant's
conviction was reversed.

Troy, 688 P.2d at 486, 487.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction under the two-prong
test in State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959 (Utah App. 1989), after a
prosecutor referred to a defendant's previous felony convictions.
Counsel for defendant originally elicited the testimony on direct
examination of the defendant.

The prosecutor then cross-examined

on the issue and used it in closing argument.

This Court found

that any possible prejudice caused by the comments were mitigated
by a court instruction stating that prior convictions could be used
only in weighing credibility and that any prejudicial error was
harmless.

Ortiz, 782 P.2d at 962.

In the case of State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), the
prosecutor in closing argument commented on lack of consent of the
victim in the aggravated sexual assault case, incorrectly stating
the law that v/as provided to the jury in an instruction.

In

addition, he stated that he was impressed by the evidence in the
case. The Court relied on reasoning in United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (1985):
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of
witnesses and expressing his personal opinion concerning
the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments
can convey the impression that evidence not presented to
the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the
charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the
defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the
evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's
opinion carried with it the imprimatur of the Government
and may induce the jury to trust the Government's
6

judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.
Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19.
That Court continued:
(A) criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned
on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone,
for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context;
only by so doing can it be determined whether the
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial.
Young, 470 U.S. at 7.
However, the Utah Supreme Court found the prosecutor's comments to
be harmless based on other comments made during the course of
trial, thereby affirming defendant's conviction. Hopkins, 782 P.2d
at 480.
In reviewing a prosecutor's misstatement of the law to the
jury on a crucial defense issue in State v. Lopez, 789 P. 2d 39
(Utah App. 1990), this Court found that the attention of the jurors
was drawn to something they should not have considered.

However,

because defense counsel immediately objected to the comment and in
detail corrected the error in her closing argument, the Court found
the prosecutor's remarks were not reversible error.
P.2d at 45.

Lopez, 789

The Court continued to evaluate the effect of the

remark on the jury and considered the strength of the evidence,
pointing out that there was "overwhelming" evidence of defendant's
guilt balanced against defendant's "improbable, contradictory, and
self-serving accounts of his actions".

The Court found that the

jury "simply chose not to believe defendant's theory" and held the
prosecutor's remarks were not prejudicial. Lopez, 789 P.2d at 46.
In a recent case, State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992),
the Supreme Court again used the two-prong test when a prosecutor
7

referred to defendant's previous convictions for forgery in closing
argument. Although defense counsel did not object, the Court found
the remarks were plain error in that they impacted the defendant's
credibility
defense".

and character,

"which were at the heart of his

The Court concluded it was a significant error and

warranted a new trial.

Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786.

Another recent case, State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
(Utah 1992), discusses prosecutor misconduct where a prosecutor
stated, "There isn't one of us here who knows how we would react in
a situation like that with four mad dogs out there beating on
someone."

Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.

The Court stated that

"mad dog" is a personal invective which reflected a lack of
detachment and should not be part of a prosecutor's rhetoric. The
Court explained:
Prosecutors engage in misconduct, however, when they
assert personal knowledge of the facts in issue or
express personal opinion in the form of unsworn testimony
that tends to "exploit the influence of the prosecutor's
office and undermine the objective detachment that should
separate a lawyer from the cause being argued. Brown, 201
Utah Adv. Rep. at 9; citations omitted.
The prosecutor's remarks in this case were simply to assist
the jury in understanding the role of the prosecutor in the trial
process. When the government is a party in a lawsuit, jurors need
to understand the role the government is taking in that lawsuit and
that the prosecutor is acting on behalf of the people and society
in general.

The jurors were asked to reflect on what government

meant to them but such reflection could elicit adverse attitudes as
well as favorable ones. Defense counsel's objection was immediate,

8

cutting off the remainder of the prosecutor's sentence.

As a

result, the jury probably did not comprehend what the prosecutor
was attempting to convey.
In her opening statement, defense counsel cautioned the jury
to only consider evidence from the witness stand or physical
evidence admitted by the Court (T. 5). The Court also instructed
the jury that they were only to consider the evidence of the
witnesses

and

that

they

could

not

base

their

verdict

on

speculation, surmise or possibility (R. 20, 31), thus mitigating
any possible effect the comments may have had on the jury.

There

was no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the case, rendering it harmless error.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d

116, 120 (Utah 1989).
In reviewing the cases of prosecutor misconduct that have
resulted in reversals of convictions, the misconduct was egregious.
In this case the prosecutor did not call attention to prior
convictions of defendant, did not misstate the law, did not comment
on the strength of the evidence or refer to defendant as a "mad
dog".
support

Additional evidence was not brought into the trial to
the

charges

and

the

remarks

did

not

indicate

any

trustworthiness of the City's case. At no time was the influence
of

the

prosecutor's

office

exploited

nor

was

defendant's

credibility or character undermined. The two-prong test set forth
in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426, has not been met in this case.
The jurors' attention was not called to something they should not
have considered and their decision was not influenced by the
9

remark.

If any error was made, it was harmless and did not result

in any prejudice to defendant as it was properly mitigated by
defense counsel and the Court in its instructions. The jury judged
the credibility of the witnesses, including defendant, and found
him guilty of Battery.

His conviction did not result from

prejudice but from the evidence presented and relied upon by the
jury.
POINT II.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF
BATTERY.
The offense of Battery under Salt Lake City Code, Section
11.08.020, as set out in the Addendum attached hereto, includes
willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of
another.

Although they were mentally handicapped and could not

remember all details and were inconsistent on some of the details,
the two witnesses for the prosecution, Mr. Knighton and Ms. Valdez,
were certain that Ms. Valdez was hit by the defendant.

The hit

knocked her to the ground, causing bruising and swelling in the jaw
area.

In addition, Mr. Ortega confirmed that the defendant was in

the area.
The Utah Courts have addressed the issue of sufficiency of the
evidence on numerous occasions holding:
In reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether it was
based on sufficient evidence, we view the evidence
presented and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the verdict. (Citations omitted)
The jury, not the appellate court, should weigh the
evidence and assess witness credibility.
State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). Thus, we will
sustain the jury's verdict where there is any evidence or
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence
10

from which the jury could make findings of all the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 9 (Utah 1992). See also
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983).
The Utah Supreme Court continued:
It lies within the province of the jury to determine the
facts, and this Court does not have the prerogative to
substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses
for that of the fact-finder. When faced with a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court, then, must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict and will overturn the verdict only when the
evidence is so lacking or insubstantial that a reasonable
person could not have reached that verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477
(Utah 1989) .
In the case of State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1992)
there was extensive inconsistent testimony among seven girls who
had been supplied alcohol by defendant at his home.

Some of the

girls said defendant was at the home all night, others said he was
not there for part of the evening. Some of the girls were offered
beer by defendant, others took the beer from the refrigerator
without objection by defendant. All but one of the girls signed a
statement

recanting their testimony to the police and their

testimony at the preliminary hearing. The jury found the defendant
guilty and the verdict was upheld despite the contradictory and
inconsistent testimony.

Vigil, 840 P.2d at 793.

In the case presently before the Court, there was inconsistent
testimony from the witnesses as to which side of Mr. Knighton Ms.
Valdez was on and which side of her face was hit.

The jury

witnessed the mental handicaps of the witnesses and judged their
credibility.

This Court should not substitute its judgment for

that of the jury particularly in this case because of the handicaps

11

of the witnesses. They were "slow" but were functioning adults and
capable of knowing the basic facts of what occurred.

The jury was

instructed on factors to consider in judging credibility (R. 28-29)
and they made a determination of that credibility.

The jury found

the important facts beyond a reasonable doubt: that defendant hit
the victim. There was sufficient credible evidence to support the
conviction of defendant.

The evidence was not so lacking or

insubstantial that it was unreasonable for the jury to reach its
verdict.

The jury simply believed the prosecution witnesses and

rejected the testimony of defendant.
CONCLUSION
The remarks of the prosecutor in this case did not amount to
prosecutorial

misconduct

or

were

minimal,

harmless

error.

Sufficient evidence is provided in the record to uphold defendant's
conviction of Battery.

Appellee respectfully requests that this

Court affirm the decision of the jury.
Dated this

cP?

day of L=Jas*-*t<i*^f

1993.

^^T^fcc

cu

Marsbar-^S. Atkin
Assistant City Prosecutor

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Mr. Carlos A. Esqueda, Salt
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Lake Legal Defender's Association, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt
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ADDENDUM
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11.08-010

11.08.050

Place of commission of offense
involving use of telephone.

11.08.010 Assault
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled
with a present ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another: It is unlawful for any
person to commit an assault within the limits of
Salt Lake City. (Prior code § 32-1-2)
11.08.020 Battery.
A battery is any wilful and unlawful use of
force or violence upon the person of another. It is
unlawful for any person to commit a battery
within the limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3)

11.08.040 Emergency telephone abuse.
A* A person is guilty of emergency telephone
abuse if such person:
1. Intentionally refuses to yield or surrender
the use ofa party line or a public pay telephone to
another person upon being informed that such
telephone is needed to report a fire or summon
police, medical or other aid in case ofemergency,
unless such telephone is likewise being used for
an emergency call; or
2. Asks for or requests the use ofa party line or
a public pay telephone on the pretext that an
emergency exists, knowing that no emergency
exists.
B. Emergency telephone abuse is a Gass B
misdemeanor.
C For the purposes of subsection A of this
section:
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which
property or human life is in jeopardy and the
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the
preservation of human life or property;
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or
telephone circuit consisting of two or more main
telephone stations connected therewith, each station with a distinctiveringor telephone number.
(Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code §
32-N20)

11.08.030 Telephone harassment.
A. A person is guilty of telephone harassment
if, with intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she:
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful
communication, including but not limited to
making a call or calls and then terminating the
call before conversation ensues; or
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls
at extremely inconvenient hours; or
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use
11.08.050 Place of commission of offense
of telephone communication in a manner likely
involving use of telephone.
to provoke a violent or disorderly response; or
Any offense committed by use of a telephone
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes
as set out in Sections 11.08.030 and 11.08.040, or
any false statement concerninginjury, death, dis- their successors, may be deemed to have been
figurement, indecent conduct or criminal con- committed at either the place at which the telephone call or calls were made, or at the place
duct of the person telephoned or any member of
where the telephone call or calls were received.
his/her family, or uses obscene, profane or
(Ord,
88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code §
threatening language with intent to terrify,
32-1-22)
intimidate, harass or annoy. The making of a
false statement as herein set out shall be prima
Chapter 11J2
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate,
harass or annoy.
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
B. Telephone harassment is a Class B misdemeanor; (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code Sections:
§ 32-1-19)
11.12.010 Riot.
376

INSTRUCTION NO.
^

As jurors, it is your exclusive responsibility to determine
the issues of fact in this case and you are to decide those issues
from the evidence received in the trial and not from speculation or
conjecture.
The evidence to be considered by you includes the testimony
of witnesses, exhibits received by the court, stipulations of the
parties, reasonable inferences to be drawn from facts proven in the
case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in these instructions, and
all of the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby.

Statements of

counsel are not evidence and should not be considered as such by you.
If and where there is a conflict in the evidence, you
should reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can; but
where the conflict cannot be reconciled then, since you are the
final judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, you
must resolve that conflict and determine from the evidence what you
believe the true facts to be.

INSTRUCTION NO.

¥•

Every person who testifies under oath is a witness. You
are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses who have testified in this case.

In determining the

credibility of a witness you may consider any matter that has a
tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his/her
testimony, including but not limited to the following:
His/her demeanor while testifying and the manner in which
he/she testified;
The character of his/her testimony;
The extent of his/her capacity to perceive, to recollect,
or to communicate any matter about which he/she testifies;
The extent of his/her opportunity to perceive any matter
about which he/she testifies;
His/her character for honesty or veracity or their
opposites;
The existence of honesty or veracity or their opposites;
The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other
motive;
A statement previously made by him/her that is consistent
with his/her testimony;
A statement made by him/her that is inconsistent with any
part of his/her testimony;
The existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by
him/her;

His/her attitude toward the action in which he/she
testifies or toward the giving of testimony; or
His/her admission of untruthfulness.
His/her prior conviction of a felony.

INSTRUCTION NO.
&

You cannot convict the defendant on mere possibilities,
surmises, or speculations, however strong they may be. A verdict of
guilty based upon mere possibilities or surmises would violate the
oath that you jurors have taken.

Nor does the law permit you to

guess or speculate as to the activities of the defendant.

